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Defenses
INTRODUCTION
The waste status of a material is in the eye of the beholder.
Spent materials used by one industry may become useful products for
other industries, through little or no processing. The same approach
holds true in the hazardous waste context. Many hazardous
materials, such as lead, mercury, industrial chemicals, and solvents
are valuable commodities, used as products themselves.' Industries
may combine them to form other products or employ them in a
manufacturing process. Even when used in one industry, a business
collecting such materials may recycle them and return them to other
industries or to the industries from which they came.2
In the context of a legal scheme that imposes liability on parties
who dispose of a hazardous substance but exculpates parties who
merely transfer a useful product, the distinction between reuse of a
product and disposal of a product is perilously sharp. Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)3 in 1980 to ensure that
all parties who contribute to the contamination of hazardous waste
sites would be held responsible for the cleanup costs.4 Accordingly,
I. See, e.g., Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1999)
(hazardous chemicals as commodities); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville &
Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1998) (alloys as commodities); Edward Hines Lumber
Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988) (wood-preserving chemicals as
commodities); United States v. Pesses, No. CIV.A.90-0654, 1998 WL 937235, at *4 (W.D. Pa.
May 6, 1998) (hazardous metals as commodities).
2. See S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 10 (1980) (recognizing that in the chemical industry "waste
from one company is feedstock to another").
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). CERCLA is also known as a
"Superfund" because it established a funding mechanism to clean up hazardous waste sites. See
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LAW, SCIENCE AND PoLICY 264-
65 (3d ed. 2000).
4. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir.
1986) (stating that the purpose of CERCLA was to provide the tools to deal with the cleanup of
hazardous waste, and to have those responsible bear the costs); S. REP. No. 96-848, at 13 (stating
that Congress's goals in enacting CERCLA were to provide for the cleanup of hazardous
substances and to hold parties liable for the clean up costs). For examples of hazardous waste
sites concerning Congress in 1980, see S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 8-9, noting the disposal of 17,000
drums of hazardous waste in the "Valley of the Drums" outside Louisville, Kentucky; the
discharge of kepone, a hazardous insecticide, into the James River in Virginia; the
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CERCLA imposes liability on those who "arrange for disposal" of
hazardous substances5 at a site that released6 contaminants. At the
same time, the CERCLA liability provisions implicitly alleviate
liability for those who send hazardous substances to a site for
recycling, use, or re-use as a product.' Courts have consequently
developed a body of case law that addresses, with some trepidation,
the distinction between a transaction for disposal and a transaction
involving a "useful product" or recyclable material.' Additionally, a
new amendment to CERCLA, the Superfund Recycling Equity Act
polychlorinated biphenyl contamination of the Hudson River in New York through the discharge
of electric insulating fluid by General Electric; and the Love Canal incident, in which highly toxic
chemicals seeped into the basements of New York residences, leading to the abandonment of two
hundred homes and a school.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994).
6. § 9601(22).
7. § 9607(a)(3). Those who "arrange for disposal" are one of four classes of potentially
liable persons under the statute, along with owners of the site, past owners of the site, and persons
who transported materials to the site. Id. § 9607(a). The four categories of covered persons
delineated by the statute "reach back through the causal chain from those who ultimately dispose
of a hazardous substance to those who transport and generate it." Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High
Point Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 774 (4th Cir. 1998). CERCLA imposes
strict liability on all parties jointly and severally. Id. The government may bring a civil action
against any liable party to recover response costs. Id. Defendants will be liable for "costs" and
"damages" associated with releases of hazardous substances or remedial actions designed to
protect against such releases. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D). Whichever party pays for the costs is
permitted by CERCLA to seek contribution from other responsible parties. Id. § 9613(f)
(authorizing contribution suits and giving settlement guidelines).
8. § 9607(a). Because the statute imposes liability for those who arrange for disposal
or treatment, by negative implication it does not impose liability for other arrangements,
such as arrangements to recycle or reuse a hazardous material. For a discussion of the
definitions of the statutory terms leading to this implication, see infra notes 28-35.
9. See Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 1123, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2000). After an extensive review of the case law, the
Interstate Non-Ferrous court noted that courts have developed several variations to the
"so-called recycling exemption" to CERCLA liability. 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1151. The
combination of rationales "has produced conflict, ambiguity and uncertainty in recycling
cases." Id. The "useful product" defense began as a way to distinguish transactions in
products that were still marketable from wastes. Most cases focus on products that were
still useful for their originally intended purpose. See Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881
F. Supp. 1516, 1526 (D. Utah 1995) (citing numerous cases involving products in working
order); California v. Summer Del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 574, 581 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(citing cases involving sale of useable products). Nevertheless, the "useful product"
defense is also considered in conjunction with recycling. See Interstate Non-Ferrous, 99 F.
Supp. 2d at 1150 (citing Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (N.D. Fla.
1994)) (focusing on whether batteries sent to a recycler were useful products). For a more
detailed survey of useful product fact scenarios, see infra notes 29-31. The "useful
product defense" and recycling defenses are not enumerated defenses in CERCLA.
Enumerated defenses include: "an act of god, an act of war" and an act or omission of a
third party not involved in a contractual relationship with the defendant. § 9607(b)(1)-(3).
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(SREA),0 responding to alleged judicial confusion over the recycling
distinction," explicitly exempts certain recycling transactions from
CERCLA liability. 2  Nevertheless, the new amendment does not
address all recycling transactions or other transactions involving reuse
of a product. 3
A second statute addressing the handling of wastes, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),14 is also especially
relevant to distinctions between disposal, recycling and reuse.
Generally, while CERCLA addresses the liability and cleanup
resulting from hazardous substance contamination, RCRA regulates
the handling of hazardous wastes from production to disposal. 5
Despite their different approaches, the two statutes provide a
comprehensive hazardous waste management legal framework.16
Several of RCRA's definitional sections relevant to the useful
product and recycling analysis are incorporated directly into
CERCLA. 17 Moreover, RCRA was the only available source of
10. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-598 (1999) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9627,
6001(a) (West Supp. 2001)).
11. Interstate Non-Ferrous, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52 (stating that, given the
circumstances surrounding the passage of the SREA, Congress clearly meant to "eliminate
ambiguity and conflict, and bring uniformity and certainty to recycler liability" in the case
law) (citing 145 CONG. REC. S15028 (1999)) (statement of Sen. Lincoln); Id. at 1143
(stating that Congress passed the SREA to "bring uniformity to federal court decisions"
involving recycler liability).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9627(a)-(b).
13. § 9627 (a)(2) (stating that liability determinations for any other materials will be
made without regard to the provisions of the SREA); § 9627(1) (stating that the SREA
should not affect characterization of other defenses); see also 145 CONG. REC. S10391-01,
*S10433 (statement of Sen. Lincoln) (discussing limitations of the SREA exemption to
liability).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994). Given that RCRA was originally enacted as an
amendment to the SWDA, it is occasionally referred to as SWDA. See, e.g., United States
v. Wedzeb Enters., 844 F. Supp. 1328, 1334-35 (S.D. Ind. 1994). Nevertheless,
commentators, practitioners, and courts analyzing the statute as a whole generally use the
RCRA acronym. PERCIVAL, supra note 3, at 204 (using RCRA acronym throughout and
stating that practitioners and courts do so as well).
15. PERCIVAL, supra note 3, at 201 (comparing the two statutes at their broadest levels).
Although RCRA is generally perceived as a regulatory scheme and CERCLA is labeled a liability
or response legal scheme, there are areas of overlap. See ieL at 207. With the enactment of the
CERCLA recycling amendments, this overlap is augmented, given that the amendments focused
on the minutiae of correct handling of recycled hazardous materials. As such, they regulate
certain aspects of hazardous materials management as much as RCRA.
16. Id. (stating that in practice, the two statutory programs are "closely linked," and that their
interrelationship has become increasingly important given the effect of management practices on
future contamination).
17. For example, the definitions of the terms "disposal," "hazardous waste," and
"treatment," are to have the meaning provided in RCRA. (The terms RCRA and SWDA are
interchangeable; hereinafter this piece uses the term RCRA.). § 9601(29). The definition of
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statutory analysis of the recycling and reuse of hazardous substances
for CERCLA cases prior to the enactment of the new CERCLA
recycling amendments. 8 The new CERCLA amendments reaffirm
many of the concepts found in RCRA,19 and RCRA remains relevant
for useful product and recycling issues outside the scope of the new
amendments.20 Consequently, even if RCRA does not address all
aspects of the CERCLA arranger liability issue,2' RCRA provides
additional structure and unity for judicial analysis when the reuse or
continued use of a hazardous substance is at issue.22
This Comment reconciles the disparate sources of law relating to
the recycling and reuse of hazardous substances. Part I isolates the
useful product and recycling issues within the overall context of
CERCLA liability, highlighting the statutory and regulatory
definitions of terms relevant to the distinction between wastes and
products.' Part II examines judicially created factors for deciphering
the nature of the arrangement between parties to a hazardous
substance transaction and analyzes the crucial factor of intent within
"solid waste," important to the concept of "disposal," which is also defined by RCRA and
accompanying RCRA regulations. See § 6903(27); Definition of Solid Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.2
(2001).
18. See, e.g., Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1994)
(looking to RCRA (referred to in the case as SWDA) to help determine whether recycling battery
parts should be considered an arrangement to dispose under CERCLA); Stevens Creek Assocs. v.
Barclay's Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (looking to RCRA definitions in recycling
case). Although RCRA is the primary statutory source of law on the issue of asbestos recycling,
common law provides further justifications as well. See Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v.
Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (reviewing the multiple
guises of the "so-called recycling exemption" before 1993, including both the RCRA
"administrative definition" of "recycling" and other non-RCRA rationales).
19. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
20. The new amendments apply only to the recycling of certain enumerated recyclable
materials but do not explicitly affect liability for other types of arrangements or materials. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9627(e) (West Supp. 2001). Presumably, RCRA continues to be relevant, as it always
has been, for legal issues associated with the management of recycling activities at currently
operating facilities. See, e.g., Owen Elec. Steel Co. v. Browner, 37 F.3d 146, 148-49 (4th Cir.
1994) (addressing the recycling of slag from a steel mill under RCRA); United States v. ILCO,
Inc., 996 F.2d 1126, 1130-32 (11th Cir. 1993) (addressing the recycling of batteries under
RCRA).
21. Those who arrange for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances are said to be
subject to "arranger liability" or "generator liability" interchangeably. See PERCIVAL, supra note
3, at 295.
22. It should be noted, now that all of the relevant sources of law have been introduced, that
a concise unified statement of legal rules on the issue of CERCLA arranger liability is impossible.
Courts and commentators have searched often and in vain for unifying principles. This Comment
will prove to be no exception. Ultimately, Congress is in the best position to provide uniform
principles for the handling, disposal and cleanup of hazardous waste.
23. See infra notes 26-116 and accompanying text.
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the strict liability framework of CERCLA.14 Part III analyzes the
potential effect of the new amendments on the judicial factors and
RCRA analysis, and concludes by examining the consequences and
wisdom of these narrow amendments.25
I. DEFINITIONAL FOUNDATION OF THE USEFUL PRODUCT AND
RECYCLING DEFENSES
A. Key Terms Isolated
In order to determine the scope of the useful product and
recycling defenses to CERCLA liability, it is helpful to isolate the
elements that these particular defenses negate. To establish a prima
facie case of arranger liability,26 the government must show that the
defendant is 1) any person, 2) who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise, arranged for, 3) the disposal or treatment, 4) of hazardous
substances, 5) owned at the time of the transfer by the 6) at any
facility from which a release of that hazardous substance, and 7)
which incurred response costs
The useful product and recycling defenses negate the third
element of this prima facie case: that the defendant arranged for
"disposal or treatment" of a hazardous substance. 8 In raising these
defenses, defendants argue that the arrangements were actually sales
or transfers of useful products,29 raw materials,30  or recyclable
materials,31 but not disposals?
2
24. See infra notes 118-58 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 159-220 and accompanying text.
26. See PERCIVAL, supra note 3, at 295.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4); see also Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 932 F. Supp. 1328,
1332 (D. Utah 1996) (listing the elements for finding liability under CERCLA); C. Greene Equip.
Corp. v. Electron Corp., 697 F. Supp. 983, 986 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (same); Maralyn Milne Reger,
Comment, A Uniform Approach for Determining Arranger Liability Under CERCLA, 1998 BYU
L. REV. 1241, 1247-48.
28. The defendant can escape liability with the useful product defense even if the other
elements are established. See, e.g., Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton
R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 775-76 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a railroad company had arranged
for the legitimate processing of a useful product where it shipped used lead bearings (containing
hazardous substances) to a processing facility that released the hazardous substances into the
environment, causing the government to incur cleanup costs); United States v. Wedzeb Enters.,
844 F. Supp. 1328, 1334-37 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (finding that although the defendants were persons
who transferred hazardous substances to a facility where a release of that hazardous substance
occurred causing the government to incur response costs, the transfer of capacitors containing
PCBs was of a useful product and thus not an arrangement for disposal).
29. See, e.g., Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1999) (sale of
unwanted but unused chemicals); GJ. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 54 F.3d 379, 384 (7th Cir.
1995) (addressing argument that a sale of a building containing asbestos insulation is the sale of a
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The key to the useful product and recycling defenses lies,
therefore, in distinguishing disposal and treatment of hazardous
material from other innocent arrangements. Although the other
elements of the prima facie case may be disputed in their own right,
they do not bear directly on the issue of disposal or treatment.33 Even
re-usable product); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1315
(11th Cir. 1990) (sale of new electrical transformers); United States v. Pesses, No. CIV.A.90-
0654, 1998 WL 937235, at *11 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 1998) (addressing the defendant's argument
that it sold "newly manufactured" metals "of first class quality" to a secondary manufacturer and
thus should not be held liable as an arranger to dispose); Wedzeb, 844 F. Supp. at 1332 (noting
defendant's argument that it had shipped capacitors to a site that were still functioning and re-
useable, and thus had not arranged for their disposal).
30. See, e.g., A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.
1998) (noting the defendant's argument that the ore shipped as a raw product was not waste and
thus should be considered a useful product for purposes of CERCLA arranger liability); A.M.
Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Forging Equip., 982 F.2d 989, 999 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing sale of chemicals
to be used in electroplating process was not an "arrangement to dispose"); Edward Hines Lumber
Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988) (accepting arguments that the sale
of newly manufactured wood treating solvents and chemicals to a wood treatment facility was not
an arrangement to dispose of the solvents); Kelley v. ARCO Indus. Corp., 739 F. Supp. 354, 355-
56 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (sale of neoprene for use in the manufacture of rubber goods).
31. See, e.g., Catelus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1994)
(outlining the defendant's argument that "spent batteries cannot be characterized as waste because
they were being recycled," and thus the transaction was not an arrangement for disposal); Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Stalely Mfg. Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 737, 747 (D.NJ. 2000) (addressing the
defendant's argument that recycling of mercury was not an arrangement to dispose); United
States v. Atlas Lederer Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 830 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (discussing circumstances under
which an "arrangement for recycling"); RSR Corp. v. Avanti Dev., Inc., No. IP 95-1359-C-M/S,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14190, at *31 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 20, 2000) (same).
32. Liability for arranging for "treatment" of a hazardous substance is less common, and this
Comment will address it secondarily. The term "treatment" has a narrower meaning than in plain
usage. In the context of CERCLA, treatment refers generally to the act of making a hazardous
substance nonhazardous. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(29), 6903(34) (1994). Like disposal, "treatment"
requires the existence of a "waste." Consequently, much of the discussion of the term "disposal"
relating to the useful product analysis applies to "treatment" as well. See, e.g., Pneumo Abex
Corp. v. High Point Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 774 n.3, 775 (4th Cir. 1998)
(addressing a treatment under the facts of the case, but applying principles gleaned from cases
that address disposals).
33. For example, whether a person is involved, whether the defendant contributed
hazardous substances under its ownership to the site, and whether a release of those
substances did in fact occur at a facility incurring response costs provide separate,
independent grounds for defenses. CERCLA defines "person" as "an individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity ... or any
interstate body." § 9601(21). This definition of "person" is broad enough to cover most
conceivable entities and individuals. This issue of whose wastes are at a site is litigated in cases
in which wastes shipped to a facility have become commingled. See, e.g., United States v. Davis,
31 F. Supp. 2d 45, 61-62 (1st Cir. 1998) (addressing the issue of whether the defendant's waste,
which was admittedly disposed somewhere as waste, can be identified at the site in question).
Courts have also held parties liable if they own or control the hazardous substance at the time of
the transfer. See, e.g., Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 409 (11 th Cir. 1996)
(holding that landowners who contracted to have their land sprayed with pesticides were not
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the more technical issue of whether the substance transferred was
hazardous is not directly relevant in useful product litigation.'
Additionally, the parties usually have no grounds upon which to
dispute that some arrangement has been made with regard to the
hazardous substance
As the crucial term for the useful product defense, "disposal" has
a technical definition. CERCLA provides that "disposal" is to have
the meaning provided in section 6903 of RCRA 6 In RCRA, disposal
has two main components: 1) action or inaction and 2) a material
defined as a "solid waste."'37 This definition is confusing because it is
liable when sprayers contaminated their own facilities with those pesticides--on the theory that
the landowners never owned or controlled the hazardous substances).
"Release" means "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment" and
includes the abandonment or discarding of receptacles containing any hazardous substance.
§ 9601(22). The difference between the definitions of "release" and "disposal" is a subtle one.
Moreover, the difficult distinction between the release of substances and the arrangement to
dispose of substances lies at the heart of the useful product inquiry. Evidence of how a release
occurred, who caused it and when it occurred are important issues to be considered later in the
analysis. Nevertheless, the fact that a release occurred is not at issue. See, e.g., Ekotek Site PRP
Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Utah 1995) (recognizing that the parties stipulated
that the hazardous substances were "released" but determining nonetheless whether the defendant
had arranged for the disposal of the hazardous substances at the time materials were transferred
onto the property). The definition of the term "facility" is so broad that any property or building
counts as a facility under CERCLA. See § 9601(9).
34. Parties may attempt to argue that a material is not hazardous as an alternate defense to
arranger liabilities but the hazardousness of the substance has no bearing on whether the product
is useful. A material can be a hazardous substance without being a hazardous waste or solid
waste. For example, the Wedzeb court determined that the chemicals were hazardous, but not
wastes. United States v. Wedzeb Enters., 844 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (S.D. Ind. 1994). The
scientific issues of what constitutes a hazardous substance is distinguishable from the issue of
what makes a material a waste or a product. The useful product and recycling defenses turn on
the waste/non-waste issue. See, e.g., United States v. Pesses, No. CIV.A.90-0654, 1998 WL
937235, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 1998) (rejecting defendant's argument that a small portion of
copper wire was not a hazardous waste). Under CERCLA, the term "hazardous substance" has a
very broad and scientifically delineated definition. In defining the term "hazardous substance,"
CERCLA incorporates by reference the substances designated as hazardous or toxic under several
other environmental law statutes. § 9601(14). It includes, as hazardous, "any element,
compound, mixture, solution or substance designated pursuant to" CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a)
(1994), "which, when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public
health or welfare or the environment." Id.
35. It is the scope and nature of the arrangement, rather than whether an arrangement existed
at all, that is crucial in useful product cases. See, e.g., Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2
F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that some arrangement had taken place between the
defendant and a facility, but questioning whether the arrangement was for a disposal).
36. § 9601(29). Section 6903 is the recodification of the original section 1004 of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act (SWDA). 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1994).
37. RCRA defines "disposal" as the "discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that
such... waste ... may enter the environment." § 6903(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
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inconsistent when read alongside parallel terms in CERCLA.
CERCLA's definition of "disposal," incorporated from the RCRA,
conflicts with its definition of "hazardous substance." The RCRA
definition requires the disposal of a "waste," not a "substance."
CERCLA instead contemplates the disposal of a "hazardous
substance."38  Furthermore, under CERCLA, there is an overlap
between the definitions of "release" and "disposal."3 9 Despite the
fact that Congress intended for a "release" of substances to include
situations where the substances are transferred to an acquiring party,
because "release" is defined as any "disposal," it may arguably also
include the act of disseminating the substance into the environment.40
Both instances have markedly different characteristics.41 These
definitional paradoxes are at the forefront of the useful product and
recycling defenses and thus merit further analysis.
B. The Role of Waste in the Definition of Disposal
Under CERCLA, determining whether a defendant transferred a
"waste" is an important first step in determining whether a defendant
made an arrangement for "disposal."'4 According to the statutory
38. This raises questions of whether CERCLA, in a useful product case, would impose
liability only for disposal of a waste product, or whether it would impose liability for disposal of a
substance that is not a waste. This difference is crucial to the useful product defense because it
requires a precise definition of waste in order to determine whether a substance has been
disposed. See infra notes 42-43; Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing two circuits' different approaches
to the statutory ambiguity between hazardous substances and wastes).
39. Compare the definition of "disposal," § 6903(3), to that of "release," § 9601(22). They
are similar in the type of actions involved (though, oddly, "release" lists some similar verbs such
as "leaking" but not others, such as "emptying"), but "release" lacks any mention of "waste" in its
definition. See § 9601(22). While a release can occur with any substance, a disposal can only
occur with a waste.
40. Importantly, a release can occur without having had a disposal. See § 9601(22); see,
e.g., United States v. Wedzeb Enters., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1328, 1337 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (fire
destroyed building containing hazardous substances). Additionally, a disposal can occur without
an immediate release into the environment. Disposal requires only some action or omission that
places a waste into a position such that it may enter the environment. § 6903(3); see infra notes
148-51 (discussing Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746,751 (7th Cir. 1993)).
41. The timing aspect of the disposal and release is further complicated by the fact that an
arrangement for disposal theoretically can occur without an immediate disposal or release of the
substance. These nuances are especially relevant in an analysis of intent to dispose. See infra
notes 118-59 and accompanying text.
42. In the useful product and recycling context, a finding that the transferred material was
not a waste precludes a finding that an arrangement for disposal took place under CERCLA. See
Freeman v. Glaxo Welcome Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Because the definition of
'disposal' refers to 'waste,' only transactions that involve 'waste' constitute arrangements for
disposal within the meaning of CERCLA."); A&W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146
F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that if a material is "not waste" it is "not subject to
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definition of these terms, it is not possible to have a disposal without
having made some arrangement with regard to a waste.43
Nevertheless, this premise leads to two further issues that have
proved divisive in arranger liability case law. First, courts have
wrestled with various methods for determining whether a material is a
"waste."" Second, once courts make their waste status
determinations, they vary on the role they allow this to play in the
overall arranger liability finding.45
Catellus Development Corporation v. United States,46 a landmark
opinion for the useful product issue, addressed the waste status
determination in a seminal way.47 Due to its influence, Catellus
provides a template upon which to address waste status issues. The
CERCLA"); Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that a
party "could be said to have arranged for ... disposal" only if the material "could be
characterized as a waste:'); Wedzeb, 844 F. Supp. at 1335 (stating that before a transaction can be
considered a 'disposal' under CERCLA, "the material exchanged must be a 'solid waste' or
'hazardous waste' ") (citing § 6903(3)). A first step in finding "treatment" is also determining the
waste status of the material treated. Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton
R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 774 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the appellee's argument that treatment can
occur whether or not hazardous substances are wastes, stating that " 'treatment' presupposes
discard") (citing § 9601(29)); A&W Smelter, 146 F.3d at 1112 (noting that the defendant "treated
the [product] only if it was waste").
43. "Disposal" is the "discharge ... of any solid waste or hazardous waste" such that it may
enter into the environment. § 6903(3) (emphasis added). "Hazardous waste" is defined as "a
solid waste" with hazardous characteristics. § 6903(5). The definition of "treatment" also
necessitates the existence of "waste." See § 6903(29).
44. See, e.g., Gould Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431, 435-36 (M.D. Pa.
1996) (declining to use the statutory or regulatory definition of waste, and employing instead the
"originally intended purpose" test to distinguish products from disposed hazardous substances);
Catellus, 34 F.3d at 751-52 (using RCRA and RCRA regulations to define "waste"); Wedzeb,
844 F. Supp. at 1335 (using RCRA, but not the RCRA regulations, to define "waste").
45. See, e.g., Pneumo Abex, 142 F.3d at 774-75 (recognizing the waste issue, but deciding
the case on other factors such as intent); Catellus, 34 F.3d at 752 (looking primarily to whether
the substance had the characteristic of waste to determine liability); United States v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., No. CIV.A.2:93-0654, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4413, at *16-*17 (S.D. W. Va.
Jan. 27, 1997) (applying multiple factors including waste status to arrive at finding that defendant
was liable).
46. 34 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 1994).
47. Amongst those generally accepting the Catellus approach are RSR Corp. v. Avanti Dev.,
Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046-48 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (noting that Catellus and similar cases
"provide guidance in the present case," and recognizing Catellus's use of the RCRA regulations);
EPA v. TMG Enter., 979 F. Supp. 1110, 1122 n.13 (W.D. Ky. 1997) (applying Catellus);
Douglas County v. Gould, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-47 (D. Neb. 1994) (distinguishing
Catellus, but finding the opinion "instructive" and supportive of its own conclusion). Those cases
generally wary of the Catellus approach are: Wedzeb, 844 F. Supp. at 1335 (employing RCRA as
Catellus later would, but declining to use regulations); Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v.
Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (outlining Catellus's
RCRA approach and claiming that such an approach "has been expressly disavowed by other
courts").
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court stated the premise that, under CERCLA, a disposal requires a
transfer of a waste.48 It also looked to whether the transferred
material, used batteries containing useful lead, were wastes according
to RCRA and accompanying RCRA regulations.49 The court found
that the materials were wastes under the RCRA regulations, 50
thereby holding the defendant liable for arranging for a disposal of
hazardous substances.5t The court relied on RCRA to make its waste
determination,52 which largely supported its finding of liability.53
These two aspects of the opinion are best analyzed in succession.
Despite the misgivings of several courts,54 Catellus arguably was
correct in looking to the RCRA regulations to define waste. In the
context of useful product and recycling cases, RCRA and its
accompanying regulations provide uniform definitions of concepts
associated with disposal, such as recycling, reuse and waste
production. These concepts help to distinguish between
arrangements to transfer wastes and useful or recycled products.
RCRA defines "solid waste"'55 as "any garbage, refuse, sludge ... and
other discarded material."56  The United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has issued regulations further defining
solid waste, which specifically address recycled, reused, and
reincorporated products. 7  Specifically, the RCRA regulations
exempt from the definition of "solid waste" any material that has
been recycled in accordance with the regulations.58  To qualify,
recycled materials must be used, in their current state, in an
48. Catellus, 34 F.3d at 750.
49. Id. at 751-52.
50. Id. at 752.
51. Id. at 753.
52. Id. at 752.
53. Id. There is room to debate whether the decision was based entirely on the waste status
of the material transferred or not. See discussion infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Mountain Metal Co., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2001)
(stating that cases interpreting RCRA regulations are not controlling under CERCLA); Interstate
Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (general disavowal); RSR Corp. v. Avanti Dev. Inc.,
No. IP 95-1359-C-MIS, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14190, at *32 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 20, 2000) ("RSR
Corp IF') (expressing concerns over applying RCRA regulations in a CERCLA case); Gould, Inc.
v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431, 435-36 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (expressing concerns
over applying definition of solid waste). See generally, infra notes 71-78 and accompanying
text.
55. Notably, solid waste, under this definition, need not be solid at all, thus the definition of
solid waste covers waste in all physical states. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1994) (including
liquids and gases as examples of solid wastes in the definition).
56. Id.
57. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2001) (defining "solid waste").
58. Id. § 261.2(e).
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"industrial process to make a product,"59 as "effective substitutes for
commercial products,"60 or as substitutes for raw materials in an
industrial process.61  At the same time, the regulations include as
waste any recycled materials that are not used in that manner, or are
otherwise used in a manner "constituting disposal."'62
According to Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,63
courts facing the question of statutory interpretation should defer to
agency regulations where the agency's statutory interpretation "fills a
gap" or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the
legislature's revealed design.' 4 On the other hand, where Congress
has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue," then "that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."65 Finally, where
neither Congress nor the agency has directly addressed an issue, the
court must rely on its own reasonable construction on the statute.
66
When deciding whether the action at issue is within the scope of
CERCLA liability, the court must interpret both statutes. Because
CERCLA directly incorporates the RCRA definition of disposal, the
issue of how to interpret CERCLA demands an interpretation of
RCRA as well. The first question is whether Congress has addressed
all of what constitutes a "disposal" under the RCRA. While the
RCRA statutory terms address the kinds of activities associated with
59. Id. § 261.2(e)(1)(i).
60. Id. § 261.2(e)(1)(ii).
61. Id. § 261.2(e)(1)(iii). The materials must be returned "to the original process from which
they are generated ... as a substitute for feedstock materials." Id. Certain traditionally recycled
materials, such as scrap metals, are not explicitly wastes, notwithstanding the above factors. Id.
§ 261.4 (a).
62. Id. § 261.2(c)(1), (e)(2)(i). This illustrates the limits of the regulations, as they do not
further elaborate on the actions that would constitute "disposal," thus leaving this task to the
courts. If anything, the regulations are close to circular in this respect. RCRA defines "disposal,"
among other things, as the "dumping" of a "solid waste" into the environment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3). The regulations define "solid waste" as any "discarded material," which can be
defined as "any material which is abandoned," including those "disposed of." 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2(a)-(b). In one sense, then, the word "disposal" has been defined as the "dumping" of a
"disposed material" which is nearly redundant.
63. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
64. Id. at 843-44 (discussing the rationale behind agency deference). According to Chevron,
"if the statute is silent or ambiguous wvith respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
65. Id. at 842-43.
66. Id. at 844. Agency guidance, practice and opinions, if available, may still carry
persuasive weight, but would not be entitled to the same judicial deference as final rules and
regulations. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-87 (2000).
2002]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
disposal,67 and provide examples of materials that are clearly subject
to disposal,68 they leave a gap for situations in which materials are
disposed or transferred in less typical ways.69 Courts must determine
whether materials are transferred for recycling or reuse in some
further process or product. The regulations provide a reasonable
answer.7° Because Congress did not directly address this aspect of the
definitions, applying the Chevron analysis, a court should defer to the
EPA's regulations in cases where they help distinguish between a
waste and a product.
Concerns of several courts about the applicability of RCRA to
useful product and recycling cases are misguided. After outlining in
detail Catellus' application of the RCRA regulations in a CERCLA
case, the court in Department of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate
Non-Ferrous Corporation71 averred that the "Catellus approach has
been expressly disavowed by other courts." 72 This is not true. The
67. See § 6903(3) (listing among actions constituting disposal, "discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing" of waste such that it may be "discharged," "emitted," or
otherwise "enter" the environment).
68. See § 6903(27) (noting that garbage, refuse and sludge constitute solid wastes).
69. For example, the statutory definitions do not further define what would constitute "other
discarded material." Id. Nor do they provide examples of what constitutes "refuse." Id.
70. Portions of the regulations have been scrutinized and characterized by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in American Mining Congress v. EPA ("AMC I"),
824 F.2d 1177, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that materials intended for future recycling should
not be considered solid wastes and should be exempt from RCRA); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA,
906 F.2d 729, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (distinguishing AMC I and holding that only recycling
involved in an ongoing process within one industry should be exempt from RCRA); and
American Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (distinguishing AMC I
and holding that only materials intended for immediate onsite recycling should not be considered
wastes). These decisions interpreted portions of the regulations, but ultimately did not strike
them down as unreasonable interpretations of RCRA. Commentators note that as a group, these
decisions essentially ratify the regulations. See R. Michael Sweeney, Reengineering RCRA: The
Command Control Requirements of the Waste Disposal Paradigm of Subtitle C and the Act's
Objective of Fostering Recycling-Rethinking the Definition of Solid Waste, Again, 6 DUKE
ENVTL L. & POL'Y F. 1, 25-30 (1996) (discussing the impact of the three D.C. Circuit Cour of
Appeals opinions together, quoting supporting views from other commentators). The RCRA
regulations have been further characterized, but by no means struck down, in more recent
decisions. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50,58 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (remanding to
EPA for correct particular application of regulations). The myriad issues associated with
administrative oversight are well beyond the scope of the Comment. For purposes of the present
CERCLA analysis, suffice it to say that the regulations are open to criticism, and as such, could
be improved to better address recycled materials issues. Sweeney, supra, at 70 (arguing that
treating recycling within the definition of solid waste creates a "regulatory folly"). Nevertheless,
courts should apply the regulations currently in force and not those applicable at the time of the
alleged disposal. Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1994).
71. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
72. Id. at 1148.
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courts to which Interstate refers in support of this proposition73 do not
address the application of RCRA regulations to the CERCLA
recycling or useful product inquiry.74 In those cases, courts did not
determine whether the material in question was a waste because its
characterization was not at issue.75 Instead, those cases addressed the
vital "statutory and regulatory distinction" between RCRA and
CERCLA in the definition of "hazardous substances. 7 6  Interstate
incorrectly expanded this distinction concerning the definition of
"hazardous substances" into a broader distinction between the
approach of RCRA and CERCLA in general.77 While CERCLA and
RCRA differ in their definitions of hazardous substances, they do not
differ in how they distinguish between wastes and products.78
73. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1202-03 (2d Cir. 1992) (relying on Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); Trans. Leasing Co. v. California,
No. CV 89-7368-WMB (GHKx), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18193, at *3-*4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5,
1990); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 699 F. Supp. 827, 833 (D. Idaho 1987); United States v.
Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D. Ariz. 1984)).
74. See B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1201-02 (discussing whether material that was admitted
to be municipal solid waste can be considered a "hazardous substance" under CERCLA). The
other courts relied upon by B.F. Goodrich (and in turn cited by Interstate Non-Ferrous) only
stand for the proposition that CERCLA does not require a substance to be listed as "hazardous"
under RCRA or any other statute to be a "hazardous substance." B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at
1200, 1203 (citations omitted) (highlighting examples where CERCLA's hazardous substance
definition does not match the regulatory definition of hazardous waste). Additionally, given that
all the cited cases were decided before Catellus, one cannot easily say that they expressly disavow
the Catellus approach.
75. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1196 (acknowledging that the case concerns a
disposal of a solid waste and that the issues on appeal are whether the particular solid waste is a
hazardous waste and whether a municipality can be liable for the disposal, given its status as a
municipality); Transp. Leasing Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18193, at *1-'*2 (considering four
limited issues, none relating to the waste/product distinction or the issue of disposal). This
Comment seeks to avoid the type of mischaracterization of the issues in arranger liability case law
(as seen in Interstate Non-Ferrous) by showing, in detail, which elements of the prima facie case
are applicable to the useful product and recycling inquiry. See supra notes 26-32.
76. B.F. Goodrich Co., 958 F.2d at 1202-03.
77. See, e.g., Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 1123,1148 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the importance of the statutory and regulatory
distinction between wastes and substances).
78. RCRA and CERCLA are unified through the shared definition of "disposal" and the
related concept of "waste." See supra notes 43-45. Moreover, the broad statements of these
courts are debatable as universal truths concerning the nature of the RCRA and CERCLA
programs. For instance, the court in B.F. Goodrich states that RCRA applies to wastes whereas
CERCLA applies to substances. 958 F.2d at 1202. From the simple standpoint of the most
fundamental statutory purpose of CERCLA, the cleanup of contaminated facilities, this statement
should strike the reader as odd. While admittedly CERCLA does concern liability associated
with the misuse of hazardous substances, it also concerns the cleanup of sites where hazardous
substances have been discarded and become wastes. RCRA and CERCLA are not so
diametrically opposed as B.F. Goodrich might have us believe. See United States v. Aceto Agric.
Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that RCRA was enacted "to deal with
problems posed by the general disposal of wastes in this country, as well as the particular
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The RCRA regulations need not dominate a court's analysis, but
they should play a specific role in characterizing disposals when
recycling or reuse is at issue. If the regulatory analysis is misdirected
to other issues within CERCLA this can lead to confusion and
mistrust in the regulations. The court in RSR Corp. v. Avanti
Development, Inc. ("RSR Corp. 11"),79 struggled to find a place for the
RCRA regulations in the arranger liability analysis. Although it
recognized RCRA as the source of the definition for the term
"disposal," the court later was uncertain how the RCRA regulations
should "govern the court's determination of the nature of the
substances" delivered by the party. 0 The RSR Corp. 11 court
cautioned that the RCRA regulations only "relate to management
and regulation of solid wastes under RCRA." 1  That statement,
unsupported as it is, not only misstates the role of the RCRA
regulations within RCRA," but also oversimplifies the relationship
between RCRA and CERCLA within the concept of disposal. 3
Rather than abandon RCRA and its regulations in their
CERCLA analysis, courts should understand that the regulations
need to serve only a limited role in useful product and recycling
litigation. RCRA should not be used in the CERCLA context to
define what materials are hazardous.' Nor should it be sufficient to
problems associated with the disposal of hazardous substances"); United Techs. Corp. v. EPA,
821 F.2d 714, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (giving an overview of the interrelationship between RCRA
and CERCLA in the management of hazardous waste).
79. No. IP 95-1359-C-M/S, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14190, at *32 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 20,2000).
80. Id.
81. Id. Consider a related statement in United States v. Mountain Metal Co., 137 F. Supp.
2d 1267, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2001), which states that cases "interpreting the regulations under the
RCRA are not controlling in CERCLA cases."
82. See Sweeney, supra note 70, at 13, 15-16 (explaining that the RCRA regulations are
more applicable to wastes that are hazardous than wastes that are not).
83. Although it is true that the RCRA regulations only relate to the management of solid
wastes, we have seen already that all materials that are "disposed" under CERCLA must also be
solid wastes. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Moreover, the way in which the
facility in question "manages" materials for recycling or reuse is central to the judicial recycling
inquiry. See, e.g., Catellus, 34 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 1994) (examining whether, in the process of
recycling lead from batteries, the facility would inevitably have to discard certain parts of the
battery). Management practices are even more central to the more recent statutory recycling
inquiry under the 1999 CERCLA Amendments. See infra notes 169-71.
84. This seemed to be the focus of concern for the court in RSR Corp. II, and also the
argument of one of the parties in that case. See RSR Corp. II, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14190, at
*32 (claiming that the party in the case failed to demonstrate why the court should "rely only on
the [RCRA] regulations for defining 'hazardous substances' "). The court was right that RCRA
should not be the sole source of the definition of "hazardous substances." CERCLA's definition
is broader. Nevertheless, RCRA is, and should be, the sole source for the definition of
"disposal."
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determine the full scope of the arrangement between parties.85
Rather, the RCRA and its regulations are useful in the CERCLA
context only for distinguishing wastes that are disposed from products
or materials that are reused or recycled.
Recognizing the usefulness of RCRA in certain aspects of
CERCLA analysis, several courts have cited the Catellus analysis of
the RCRA regulations or employed the regulations.86 In RSR Corp.
v. Avanti Development, Inc. ("RSR Corp. I"),' the court noted that
lead plates previously extracted from batteries were not wastes under
the RCRA regulations.' This interpretation meant that the transfer
was not a disposal of a hazardous substance according to the
RCRA/CERCLA definition of disposal.8 9 In United States v. Pesses,
the court applied the RCRA regulations and rejected the defendant's
argument that the materials transferred were not wastes.90 Under the
RCRA regulations, the materials were wastes.91 This fact, along with
other factors92 lead the court to find the defendant guilty of arranging
to dispose of hazardous substances.
Other courts have at least accepted the interrelationship between
RCRA and CERCLA in the useful product and recycling context.93
85. See discussion of intent, infra notes 118-39.
86. RSR Corp. v. Avanti ("RSR Corp. 1"), 68 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046-48 (S.D. Ind. 1999)
(recognizing the potential application of the Catellus RCRA approach); United States v. Pesses,
No. CIV.A.90-0654, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7902, at *17 n.19 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 1998) (applying
RCRA regulations to determine that material transferred was a solid waste, without mentioning
Catellus).
87. RSR Corp. I, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
88. Id. at 1047-48. The court reasoned that "[m]aterials are not solid waste when they can
be shown to be recycled by being ... used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process to
make a product, provided that the materials are not being reclaimed." Id. (quoting Catellus Dev.
Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 752 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e) (1993)
(regulations defining solid waste)). In this case, the material sent to the smelter was not being
reclaimed at the smelter. According to the regulations, "[a] material is 'reclaimed' if it is
processed to recover a usable product, or if it is regenerated." 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(4) (2001).
Examples of reclamation are the "recovery of lead values from spent batteries." Id. at 1048
(quoting § 261.1(c)(4)). In this case the lead was recovered from the spent batteries before it was
sent to the facility where the release occurred, and they were in need of no further recovery before
recycling. Id. at 1048. Thus, the court reasoned, the transaction was not an arrangement for
treatment. Id.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1994).
90. United States v. Pesses, No. CIV.A.90-0654, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7902, at *17 n.19
(W.D. Pa. May 6, 1998).
91. Id. (citing § 261.4(a)(13); § 261.2(c)).
92. Id. at *14-15, *17 (noting that materials required processing before they could be
recycled and that the defendant knew the materials would require treatment).
93. See Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769,
774 (4th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that if Congress had not wished to apply the RCRA definitions to
CERCLA issues it would not have directly referenced them in the meaning of disposal and
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Nevertheless some of the same courts that interpret RCRA
independently of the regulations risk ignoring the nuances in the
RCRA distinction between "wastes" and "recycled" or "reused"
materials.94 For example, the court in United States v. Wedzeb,95
characterized the terms of the RCRA without consulting the
regulations.96  By using a dictionary and its own reasoning, it
determined that a waste must be "the worthless or useless part of
something.197 In turn, the court held that "the marketplace provides
a reasonable objective gauge of product worth."9 This definition of
waste proved determinative because the court determined that the
product99 had a market. As such, the court held that the transfer of
the product was not an arrangement to dispose.1° The court failed to
complete its analysis, because material value in the marketplace alone
should not distinguish wastes from products. 1 ' When the definition
of waste proves dispositive, courts should employ the detailed RCRA
definitions of waste, which depend on more than a marketability
treatment); Pesses, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7902, at *17 n.19 (applying the RCRA regulations to
determine that the material transferred was a solid waste); United States v. Valentine, 885 F.
Supp. 1506, 1514 n.3 (D. Wyo. 1995) (noting that in the useful product and recycling context,
CERCLA and RCRA are "not significantly different," and that the RCRA and CERCLA analysis
involves analogous considerations); United States v. Wedzeb Enters., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1328,
1335 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (looking to the RCRA definition of waste).
94. Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775-76 (scrutinizing the treatment process, but not
applying the regulations); Wedzeb, 844 F. Supp. at 1335-36.
95. 844 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
96. Id. at 1334-35.
97. Id. at 1335 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
UNABRIDGED 935, 1910 (1993) (definition of garbage and refuse)) (reasoning that garbage and
refuse were synonymous and that the dictionary definition of refuse would serve as an adequate
definition).
98. Id. at 1336.
99. Id. at 1331-32 (describing surplus electrical capacitors).
100. Id. at 1336 (holding that consumer demand for Wedzeb's capacitors was sufficient to
support a finding that they were not "waste" or "refuse").
101. See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting the defendant's argument that simply because the transferred materials had value on the
market, they were not waste subject to treatment); Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp.
1516, 1526 (D. Utah 1995) (stating that the focus in useful product cases is not whether the
material has economic value, but whether the material is fit to perform its original function);
United States v. Summit Equip. & Supplies, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1422, 1431 (N.D. Ohio 1992)
(stating that the key inquiry is whether material is sold for a purpose to dispose, and if the
purpose is to dispose, the material's actual value or use is irrelevant). Although some courts have
looked to a material's value to distinguish wastes from non-wastes, generally this is not the sole
factor in the decision. See, e.g., A.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 999
(6th Cir. 1993) (looking at the value and usefulness of materials sold in addition to the intended
purpose of parties); United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (N.D.
Ill. 1992) (focusing on the continued usefulness of product, valuable consideration and intent that
the product would be entirely used for the purpose for which it was sold).
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analysis,"° rather than relying solely on its own "common sense"
interpretation of material worth or marketability.
Without mentioning RCRA, some courts employ concepts, but
not the exact language, found in the RCRA regulations as factors to
distinguish between waste and non-waste materials.103  The
regulations may suggest ways of relaxing these factors or adjusting
them in ways that accommodate recycled materials markets. For
example, a court that allows the useful product defense to succeed
only if the product transferred "is a new product, manufactured for
the purpose of sale," or a product that "remains useful for its normal
purpose in its existing state,"'" might be taking an approach narrower
than what the RCRA regulations suggest. Even courts that require a
transfer of a product that "requires no further processing to be
productively used," may not have accommodated the breadth of the
RCRA exceptions.05 The RCRA regulations provide that when
materials are being recycled by "being returned to the original process
from which they are generated ... as a feedstock material," or "used
or reused as ingredients in an industrial process to make a product"
102. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2000). The regulations do consider the concept of marketability,
but within the overall context of reuse. Materials will not be considered solid wastes if they are
recycled by being "used or reused as effective substitutes for commercial products." Id
(emphasis added). If materials can be recycled in that manner, then no components of the
materials end up as waste products that must be discarded.
103. See, e.g., Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d
769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that other courts looked to whether materials "were to be reused
entirely or reclaimed and then reused" and to "the state of the product at the time of transferal"
and their usefulness without reconditioning) (emphasis added); Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown,
858 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (discussing the factors courts use to distinguish
between wastes and products, such as whether a receiving party would use the product in the
manner for which it was manufactured).
104. Courtaulds Aerospace Inc. v. Huffman, 826 F. Supp. 345, 354 (1995) (citing California
v. Summer Del Caribe, Inc. 821 F. Supp. 574, 581 (E.D. Cal. 1993)); see United States v. Pesses,
No. CIV.A. 90-0654, 1998 WL 937235, at *12 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 1998) (examining whether a
"commodity being sold will continue to be used for its originally intended purpose without
processing") (citing Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431, 436 (M.D. Pa.
1996)); Ekotek, 881 F. Supp. at 1526-27 (using the "original purpose" test); Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same).
105. Gould, 933 F. Supp. at 436 ("The test for successfully asserting what has become known
as the 'useful product' defense is whether the commodity being sold will continue to be used for
its originally intended purpose."); see also Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164
(2d Cir. 1999) (finding no waste, thus no disposal, when materials transferred were "unused"
chemicals that the manufacturer "could ordinarily use in its laboratories" that the purchaser could
"use... in their unadulterated form"); Chatham Steel Corp., 858 F. Supp. at 1140 ("When a party
sells a product incidentally containing a hazardous substance but having value as being useful, for
the purpose for which it was manufactured, then the transaction is less likely to be an
'arrangement' to dispose of a hazardous substance.").
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they are not wastes.106 The RCRA regulations go a step beyond
allowing only immediate reuse. They allow transformation then
reuse.
Despite the merit of the RCRA analysis, the common use of a
"multi-factor" analysis by courts' 7 should raise concerns that Catellus
did not address in enough detail all the aspects of CERCLA arranger
liability. 0 Even if a material can be characterized as a waste, the
defendant's actions with regard to the material may not have been an
arrangement for disposal at the time of transfer. Catellus did not
clearly delineate multiple steps in its analysis.1°9 The last substantive
sentence of the opinion stated that "it is sufficient" that the batteries
had the characteristic of waste, as defined under RCRA, at the time
that it was delivered to the other party."1 Earlier, however, the court
stated that the fact that the battery parts would "have to be gotten rid
of" at some point in the recycling process provided "further support"
for its holding."'
Other courts, however, cite the Catellus holding with approval
without mentioning the RCRA analysis."' This raises questions
106. § 261.2 (emphasis added).
107. See Concrete Sales & Servs., Inc. v. Blue Bird Body Co., 211 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (1 1th
Cir. 2000) (noting additional factors such as the transferring party's knowledge and intent, and
whether the party made the "crucial decision" to place hazardous substances with a particular
facility); Pneumo Abex, 142 F.3d at 775 (discussing both materials-related factors and others,
such as the intent of parties); United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., Inc., No. CIV.A. 2:93-0654,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4413, at *16-*17 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 27, 1997) (citing factors considered
by courts in determining arranger liability in addition to those related to the status of the material,
including "knowledge of and control over" disposal, "intent of the party," and the seller's
business practices in transferring similar materials).
108. For example, one court applying multiple factors (including the waste status factor)
emphasized that "none of the factors" is "dispositive." Concrete Sales, 211 F.3d at 1336. This
implies that, in the Eleventh Circuit's view, no court should rely on just the waste status of a
material transferred to determine liability.
109. See supra notes 50-53 (discussing Catellus's holding).
110. Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748,752 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
This implies that the finding is sufficient to hold liability. Another court interpreted Catellus as
imposing liability based on the waste status of the material alone. See Douglas County v. Gould,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Neb. 1994) (recognizing that, under Catellus, "disposal"
necessarily included the concept of waste, and that "because spent batteries could be defined as
waste, [the Catellus defendant] could be held liable for arranging for their disposal"); see also
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Catellus to support the proposition that waste status is sufficient for a finding of summary
judgment).
111. In other words, the court is implying by its use of passive voice that someone would
have to take action with regard to the wastes. The defendant, knowing this, was thus arranging
for a disposal.
112. See, e.g., Pneumo Abex, 142 F.3d at 775 (stating that Catellus focused on the intent of
the parties to determine that the seller might be liable); American Cyanamid, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4413, at *17 (citing Catellus's holding that parties would need to "get rid of' waste); Sea
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though about what exactly supported the holding in Catellus. Several
courts state that Catellus was decided based on other factors. For
example, Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery cited Catellus for the
proposition that a material used for its "originally intended purpose"
is not a waste that is being disposed.1  Douglas County v. Gould, Inc.
relied on the proposition in Catellus that a waste material is one that
had to be "gotten rid of.""' 4 Ultimately, however, these factors can be
reconciled with Catellus's analysis, as they relate back to the RCRA
distinction between waste and product within the definition of
disposal.
Whether a material is used for its "original intended purpose,"
the question from A&M Battery, is simply another way of asking
whether it meets the RCRA requirements of being a "commercial
substitute" or "feedstock" in an industrial process. As with the
previous factors discussed earlier," 5 the original intended purpose test
could be unified and more precise if couched in RCRA terms.
Similarly, the Douglas County "got rid" of analysis is only a more
conversational way of saying that a party "disposed" of it."6
Lion, Inc. v. Wall Chem. Corp., 974 F. Supp. 589, 599 n.17 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (noting that
Catellus found an arrangement for disposal based on "the inherent generation of hazardous
waste" in the transaction at issue).
113. Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431,436 (M.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd
on other grounds, Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Svc., 232 F.3d 162, 172 (3d Cir. 2000)
(remanded to apply new recycling amendments to the case, where applicable).
114. Douglas County, 871 F. Supp. at 1246-47. Under the Catellus facts, in other words,
there was always a useless part of the battery that would have to be removed and discarded before
valuable lead could be recovered. That discarded portion of the battery was thus definable as a
waste product.
115. See supra notes 95-103.
116. One court that carried out this replacement of terms admitted that it was doing nothing
more than replacing one term with another. In Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 932 F. Supp.
1328, 1336 (D. Utah 1996), the court stated that in order to hold a person responsible for arranger
liability, the person must have intended to 'get rid of its hazardous wastes.'" Id. It explained
that it used the word "dispose" in its "ordinary sense, not in any statutory sense." Id.; see also
Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1575 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding a producer of
slag as a by-product liable where the by-product was a material that "the producers wanted to get
rid of whether they could sell [it] or not"); Reger, supra note 27, at 1253-54 (suggesting that
"'arranged for' disposal" should mean "participat[ing] in the decision to 'get rid' of a substance")
(citing Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 948 F. Supp. 994, 997 (D. Utah 1996)). The phrase "get
rid of" is extremely problematic in the context of a technical environmental statute. This is
because, in common usage, "get rid of' is not always synonymous with "disposal," and does not
preclude the possibility of reuse. For example, a retail manager might say to salespersons "we
need to get rid of last year's model or designs before we order any more of this year's." In
contrast, a homeowner might say "let's get rid of this old carpet." The second usage is closer to
the statutory definition of disposal than the first. However, in all cases the material in question
may or may not be reused. The "get rid of language" does not expand on the analysis of whether
and how the material is ultimately used.
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But not all factors employed by courts can be reduced solely to a
waste product analysis." 7 The phrasing of the CERCLA arranger
liability provision logically requires further findings beyond the
general nature of the product at the time the hazardous substances
are released into the environment. Namely, CERCLA imposes
liability only on those "who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arrange" for disposal, and not, for example, simply on those "who
dispose." Once a court determines that a waste has been transferred,
the key remaining question is how to link the defendant to the waste.
To do this the court must characterize what it means to "contract,
agree or otherwise arrange" for the disposal of a waste.
II. THE PARADOX OF INTENTIONAL AcTION IN CERCLA
ARRANGER LIABILITY
Given that CERCLA does not define the phrase "arranged for,"
courts must find an equitable means to distinguish arrangements to
dispose of substances from arrangements to recycle or reuse them.118
Looking first at the plain language of the statute, a court has several
choices in construing the phrase "contract, agree or otherwise arrange
for disposal." The phrase is open to a strict liability interpretation, a
specific intent interpretation, and an intermediate interpretation.
Strict liability lies at one end of the statutory interpretation
spectrum. Under this view, to be liable, a party must simply make
any arrangement that leads to the release of a hazardous substance.
At first glance, CERCLA would seem to require such an
interpretation of arranger liability. 9 Courts and commentators have
invariably labeled CERCLA a "strict liability" statute.1 20 Policy
117. Most notably, the factor of intent, cannot, on its face, be reduced to waste-definition
analysis. Intent, after all, addresses a party's state of mind and not the nature of the product. See,
e.g., Pneumo Abex, 142 F.3d at 775. Nevertheless, the nature of the product often depends on the
party's state of mind. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
118. See South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 406 (1lth Cir. 1996)
(stating that Congress has left the task of defining "arranged for" to the courts, some of which
have considered intent of parties to determine whether an arrangement took place); United States
v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 871 (D. Del. 1989) (noting that Congress did not
"illuminate the trail" to the intended scope and meaning of arranger liability); Reger, supra note
27, at 1253 ("The most effective way to improve the national uniformity of CERCLA's liability
determinations for arrangers would be for Congress to expressly define the term 'arranged
for.' ").
119. See United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996) ("At
first blush, discussing state of mind ... appears inappropriate.").
120. See Pneumo, 142 F.3d at 774 (citing Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1993))
(stating that "CERCLA imposes strict liability"); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,
167 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting "the overwhelming body of precedent has interpreted [CERCLA]
section 107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme"); Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond
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reasons, reflecting common law treatment of abnormally dangerous
activities, support the imposition of strict liability.'2' Nevertheless,
simply labeling CERCLA a strict liability statute does not provide a
clear rule of application in all cases given that strict liability can mean
different things to different sources. Depending on the court or
commentator, "strict liability" under CERCLA can mean liability
"without fault,"'2 liability "without intent,"'" or liability "without
regard to causation.'
1 24
Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that Congress imposed strict
liability in CERCLA subject only to enumerated defenses, such as acts of God and acts of war);
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended that
responsible parties be held strictly liable."); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co.,
579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (discussing the legislative history and early case law
on the strict liability view of CERCLA); see, e.g., David W. Lannetti, Note, "Arranger Liability"
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation Liability Act (CERCLA):
Judicial Retreat from Legislative Intent, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 279, 307-13 (1998)
(discussing the basis for labeling CERCLA as a strict liability statute); Susan R. Poulter, Cleanup
and Restoration: Who Should Pay?, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 77, 84-86 (1998)
(discussing the strict liability nature of CERCLA).
121. See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 13-14 (1980). Strict liability is justified because it "assures
that those who benefit financially from a commercial activity internalize the health and
environmental costs of that activity into the costs of doing business," and that it appropriately
allocates "the risks imposed upon society by the manufacture, transport, use, and disposal of
inherently hazardous substances." Id. (emphasis added). To do otherwise would be "to condone
a system in which innocent victims bear the actual burden of releases, while those who conduct
commerce in hazardous substances which cause such damage benefit with relative impunity." Id.
(emphasis added); see also id. at 33-34; THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA,
CLEANING UP THE MESS, IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND 20 (1993) (discussing
policy reasons for strict liability).
122. United States v. Wedzeb Enters., 844 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (S.D. Ind. 1994) ("Liability
under CERCLA is without regard tofault.") (citations omitted); Letter from Alan A. Parker, Asst.
Attorney General to Rep. James J. Florio, Chairman, Subcomm. On Trans. & Commerce, Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce (Dec. 3, 1980), reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. 31,966 (1980)
(stating that both CERCLA and the Clean Water Act provide for liability subject to certain
enumerated defenses, but that "neither provision allows for a defense based on the defendant's
non-negligent conduct or exercise of due care"); see also Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281,
290 n.16 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[Sltrict liability signifies liability without fault .... [A]t a minimum
strict-liability doctrines do require that the defendant's conduct be a cause of the plaintiffs
injury.").
123. See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 712 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that
responsible parties are liable "regardless of their intent"); General Elec. Co. v. Aamco
Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 285 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); Lannetti, supra note 120, at 284-
95 (labeling a strict liability interpretation of the arranger liability provision under CERCLA as
one where "'arranged for' does not require an intent to dispose of hazardous waste") (citing
United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989)).
124. See Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000)
(stating that in CERCLA "causation requirements were abandoned in favor of a strict liability
regime") modified by 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22863 (9th Cir. 2001); Pneumo Abex, 142 F.3d at
774 (stating that because CERCLA is a strict liability statute, plaintiffs generally "need not prove
causation, only that the defendant is a 'covered person' "); John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA,
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At the opposite end of the statutory construction spectrum
would be an interpretation that isolates the phrase "contract, agree or
otherwise arrange for disposal" from the broader CERCLA context.
Such a specific intent approach would require that a party
intentionally and knowingly called for the disposal of a hazardous
substance in order to be liable. No court has explicitly adopted the
view that specific intent is required before liability can be imposed.'t 5
Rather, courts have generally adopted what amounts to a hybrid
between the specific intent and strict liability views, looking to intent
as a factor in the overall arranger liability analysis.12 6 Therefore, even
though CERCLA is a strict liability statute, courts have accepted that
intent must play some role in arranger liability analysis.
By stating simply that "intent" is a factor, without indicating the
level of intent required, many courts leave the intent issue
determination ambiguous.127 Nevertheless, in a more instructive
Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MiNN. L. REV. 1493, 1507-08 (1994) (noting that CERCLA
does not require a finding of causation).
125. The court in United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1491, 1501 (E.D. Ark.
1995) specifically noted that CERCLA does not require "proof of specific intent to arrange for the
disposal of hazardous substances." See also United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1089
(8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the defendant's argument that CERCLA requires "specific intent" to
arrange for the disposal of hazardous substances). There is room to debate whether another court,
Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex, 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993), which stated in curt terms that intent
is an integral part of arranger liability analysis, implying that specific intent to arrange to dispose
was required. However, the Amcast court stated simply that "[t]he words 'arrange for' imply
intentional action," and did not mention "specific intent" per se. Id. at 751. For a more complete
analysis of the opinion, see infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text. One commentator stated
that Amcast adopted a "specific intent approach" without explaining what it meant. Lannetti,
supra note 120, at 296.
126. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Concrete Sales and Servs, Inc. v. Blue Bird
Body Co., 211 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2000), stated that afactor in arranger liability is whether "the
party intended to dispose of a substance at the time of the transaction." Id. at 1336-37 (citing
South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 406-07 (11th Cir. 1996)). While this
does not mean that intent to dispose is required, it does imply that liability will be less likely if
such an intent is not present. See also Pneumo, 142 F.3d at 775 (citing several decisions in which
intent is a factor in courts analysis); United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., Inc., No. CIV.A.2:93-
0654, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4413, at *16-*17 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 27, 1997) (citing knowledge,
intent and purpose among several factors in determining liability).
127. For example, in American Cyanamid, the court simply states that a factor for
determining whether there was an arrangement for disposal is "the intent of the party." 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4413, at *17. This leaves open the question, "intent of the party to do what?"
Ambiguity does have its benefits in this area of law because it arguably enables a better "fact-
specific inquiry into the nature of the transaction." Pneumo Abex, 142 F.3d at 775 (citation
omitted). Nevertheless, it does not encourage uniformity across courts that Congress and
commentators might like to see. The fluidity and complexity of strict liability and the specific
intent analysis complicates the interpretation and application of environmental laws. See Susan
F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental
Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1179-1204 (1995) (discussing the development of strict liability
laws).
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opinion, the Cello-Foil court explained the role of intent in arranger
liability determinations. 1' Inherent in the act of arranging is an
intention to arrange for something. In determining whether that
party arranged or contracted for something, the court must determine
exactly what that "something" is.129 Given that an essential issue in
contract law is what the parties to a contract or arrangement
intended,130 intent must play a role in determining arranger liability.
31
The Cello-Foil court also used language that more closely
resembled the strict liability outlined above. For example it stated
that once the court determines that the party has the requisite "intent
to be an arranger," then "strict liability" takes effect. 32 Notably the
court did not require intent to dispose, but only intent to arrange. 133
At another point it stated, with careful wording, that the inquiry in
arranger liability cases is whether "the party intended to enter into a
transaction that included an 'arrangement for' the disposal of a
128. See United States v. Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting the
"indispensable role that state of mind must play" in determining arranger liability).
129. Id. (stating that the terms "contract," "agreement," and "otherwise arranged" all "indicate
that the court must inquire into what transpired between the parties and what the parties had in
mind with regard to disposition of the hazardous substance"). Compare the liability provision for
"owners" with that for "arrangers." CERCLA imposes liability upon "the owner" or past owner
of "any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-
(2) (1994), and those who "arranged for disposal ... of hazardous substances." Id. § 9607(a)(3).
Note that an owner may become an owner of property without having intended to own, release, or
be otherwise involved with hazardous wastes at all. An arranger must have some arrangement
regarding the disposal of a hazardous substance. The wording of the statute suggests this
distinction. For example, the statue could have been written differently such that the owner need
not contract or otherwise arrange to be the owner of a facility from which there is a release of
hazardous substances, or even contract or arrange to be an owner of a parcel of land containing
hazardous substances in order to be liable. An arranger for disposal, however, arguably must
intend to do something other than just be an arranger. Consequently, the arranger liability
provisions are not worded as follows: "one who contracts or arranges anything with a facility
from which there is a release shall be liable."
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981). The Restatement of
Contracts provides that "the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange." Id. (emphasis added); see also JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 25-30 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing the
role of intent in contract law). It was clear to the Cello-Foil court that a contract requires intent
to contract for something. Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1231. The court accepted this premise as a
fundamental legal principle. It only needed to show that an "arrangement" was equivalent to a
contract in its need for intent. To do this, it must look to principles of statutory construction. The
court stated that "we derive the intent element from the canons of statutory construction.
'Otherwise arranged' is a general term following in a series two specific terms and embraces the
concepts [of intent] similar to those of 'contract' and 'agreement.' " Id. (citing 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (1992)).
131. 1001F.3dat1231.
132. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
133. This is why this approach might be labeled an intermediate, or "general intent" approach.
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hazardous substance. '' "M By wording the rule in such a way, the
Cello-Foil court implies that a party need not intend a disposal at the
time of the transaction.135 Rather, the party need only intend to enter
into a transaction that can be characterized as an arrangement for
disposal of a hazardous substance. 36 Explaining the application of
the rule, the Cello-Foil court noted that courts should not require a
"specific intent" to arrange for a disposal in a "particular manner or
at a particular site."'37 The party who made the arrangement is liable
for damages caused by the disposal, "regardless of the party's intent
that the damages not occur."'a3  Likewise, a party can be responsible
for "arranging for" disposal, even when it has no control over the
process leading to the release of substances.139
The Cello-Foil court's discussion of intent is the most complete in
arranger liability case law, but it is not the only view on the subject.
The full extent of the intent inquiry is debatable given the ambiguity
in the CERCLA statutory terms. 4' If the intent inquiry is taken too
far in favor of defendants, however, the strict liability nature and
purpose of CERCLA seems in jeopardy. 4' In G.J. Leasing Co., Inc.
134. 100 F.3d at 1231.
135. Compare, for example, the wording of a contrasting rule announced by another court,
Concrete Sales, when it stated that a factor is "whether the party intended to dispose" of a
hazardous substance. Concrete Sales & Serv., Inc. v. BlueBird Body Co., 211 F.3d 1333, 1336-
37 (11th Cir. 2000). Note how the intent is more directly applied to the disposal itself, rather than
to the arrangement or the mere transaction, as in Cello-Foil.
136. The passive voice is essential in this phrase. It is not the party making the transaction
who necessarily intends to characterize the transaction as a disposal. Naturally, many parties
transferring hazardous substances wish to have the transaction considered merely a sale of a
useful material.
137. 100 F.3d at 1232.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir.
1994)).
140. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text. See generally United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("It leaves much to be desired from a syntactical
standpoint ... [and] the legislative history CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for
its unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements.").
141. The complexity of the intent analysis in arranger liability cases results from the
conjunction of two vastly different inquiries, one based on the mere status of a party as "one who
arranges" and the other based on a strict liability connection between the defendant and response
costs. Above both inquiries, however, CERCLA calls for devotion to an overall statutory
purpose, namely ensuring that those responsible for disposing pay the costs of cleanup. See
United States v. Mountain Metal Co., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1274 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (citing
CERCLA's "overwhelmingly remedial" statutory scheme); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.
Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1984) ("Given the remedial nature of CERCLA, its provisions should be
afforded a broad and liberal construction so as to avoid frustration of prompt response efforts or
so as to limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond the limits expressly
provided.").
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v. Union Electric Co.,142 the court stated that it would not "attribute
the negligent unforeseeable conduct of the buyer's agents to the
seller."143 Instead, the court focused on whether the seller "knew or
could ever have known" what the buyer intended to do with the
product, and whether "the primary purpose and likely effect" of the
sale were to bring about a release."M Similarly, in Amcast Industrial
Corp. v. Detrex Corp.,45 the court arguably applied a negligence
standard when it could have used a more appropriate strict liability
standard to reach the same result.146 In overly cautious terms, the
court refused to hold a selling party liable for an "accidental spilling"
of hazardous substances en route to a buyer. 47
CERCLA calls for a much broader interpretation than that
stated by G.J. Leasing or Amcast.148 Both courts' rule of law would be
incorrect under CERCLA if the initial transfer to put the products in
the buyer's hands had itself been an arrangement for disposal. If that
142. 54 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1995). In G.J. Leasing, a landowner sold a parcel of land on which
stood a decommissioned factory, insulated by asbestos. Id. at 382. The asbestos insulation was
not being released into the environment at the time of transfer, as the building and its materials
were intact. Id. at 382-83. However, the buyer demolished a portion of the building, causing a
release of asbestos. Id.
143. Id. at 385. The court would not do so even "in Superfund Cloudcuckooland." Id That
the court would use such an expression to describe this area of law is a concession that it is
venturing into murky legal waters, and that often CERCLA calls for results that run counter to
common law equitable principles.
144. Id.
145. 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993).
146. In Amcast, a manufacturer, Detrex, regularly arranged with a transportation service to
have its newly manufactured triclorylethelyne (TCE), a hazardous substance, shipped to a
purchasing secondary manufacturer. 2 F.3d at 747-48. As a part of the transfer to the second
manufacturer the transport vehicle occasionally would spill TCE on the ground at the plant by
accident, thereby causing a release of hazardous substances. l at 748. The court held that
Detrex was not liable under CERCLA for the cleanup costs associated with the accumulated
spills. Id at 751.
147. Id. at 751. The court stated that "no one arranges for an accident" unless it is, in the rare
case, a staged accident. Id. Consequently, the court reasoned that in the context of a party who is
arranging for the transportation of a product, "disposal" excludes accidental spillage. This
contrasts with the context of the operator of a hazardous waste dump, when "disposal" includes
accidental spillage. Id. Essentially, then, the court would not attribute the unforeseen conduct of
an independent contractor to the seller, and accordingly held the seller not liable for an accidental
release of hazardous substances. Id.
148. To make a bright-line rule which releases a defendant from liability simply because the
release was unforeseen would negate the entire strict liability scheme of the statute. CERCLA
does not impose liability on those who "arrange for a release of hazardous substances," as the
Amncast court would have us believe. Id. (focusing on the ultimate release of hazardous
substances, not necessarily on a disposal which might have taken place earlier). Rather,
CERCLA imposes liability on those who have arranged for a disposal of hazardous substances,
where, and however, a release of such hazardous substances occurs. An arranger simply need not
know or intend how the substances will be released in order to be liable. See United States v.
Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
were the case, the seller could be held liable for a later accidental or
negligent release of hazardous substances. Consequently, G.J.
Leasing and Amcast focus on the wrong legal issue, even though the
outcome of the cases might have been warranted on the facts.149 The
more accurate inquiry is simply whether the initial transfer from seller
to buyer was an arrangement for disposal, and not whether the actual
release of the materials transferred into the environment was
accidental. This is because, in many cases, it is presumably a
negligent act of a buyer or a buyer's agents that ultimately causes the
release of the substances.1 50 Consequently, the nature of the act
causing the release should not be the dispositive factor for
determining whether the original transferor should be liable as an
arranger. Rather, the ultimate release should be considered only
insofar as it plays a role in shaping the initial arrangement to transfer
hazardous substances.'
5'
The Cello-Foil discussion illustrates that one cannot simply say
that arranger liability "requires intent," as several courts and
commentators have done. 52 If courts accept intent as an element in
arranger liability, the issue becomes how courts are to measure and
characterize such intent. As in any case in which courts must
determine a party's intent, evidence describing the subjective state of
mind of the actor, such as testimony of the actor himself, will not
149. The pivotal evidence is the nature of the product at the time of transfer and the purpose
of the arrangement made at transfer. The Amcast court pointed out that the shipper is not subject
to CERCLA liability when he is initially not trying to arrange for the disposal of hazardous
wastes, but instead arranges for the delivery of a useful product. 2 F.3d at 751.
150. See, e.g., Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that
when chemicals were negligently released at buyer's plant, seller was not held liable for arranging
for a disposal on grounds that the material transferred was initially not a waste); United States v.
Wedzeb Enters., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (describing how General Electric sold
unused working transformers to Wedzeb, who was a broker for surplus, unused, fully operational
electrical components, and who did not change the state of the capacitors in any way, and when a
fire destroyed the Wedzeb warehouse causing the release of PCB's, General Electric was not
liable as an arranger to dispose on grounds that the transformers were transferred as a useful
product); cf. Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 750-52 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding a
buyer liable when it sold unusable batteries to a battery breaker which negligently placed bits of
battery casings on the land surrounding the plant).
151. For example, if a release is foreseeable, this is evidence that the transferor made an
arrangement to dispose. Likewise, if a release is unforeseeable, this is evidence that the transferor
did not make such an arrangement. Still, other factors could tend to show that the transferor made
an arrangement to dispose. Even if the release was caused by an unforeseeable negligent act, the
material may have had no use as a product and may have been abandoned by the transferor.
152. A.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1993); Amcast, 2
F.3d at 751 (announcing that the term "arranged for.., implies intentional action").
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necessarily be the most probative.153 For example, many courts
accept the premise that by merely framing a transaction as a sale a
party will not automatically free itself from arranger liability.1 "4
Rather, frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be the
"objective evidence of what actually happened," given that
"normally, the actor is presumed to have intended the natural
consequences of his deeds."
155
Consequently, courts, in their intent analysis, may look at
whether the transferring party could have otherwise used the
materials in its own business, 156 whether the purchasing party could
use the materials without transforming them first,'57 whether the
selling party sold the product on the open market, and whether a
party transferring a product for treatment intentionally left residue of
hazardous substances inside the product.158  These factors overlap
with the prior inquiry into whether the material transferred was a
waste,"5 9 thereby illustrating a common link in the useful product and
recycling analysis. This overlap shows that the state of the material at
the time of transfer will often be the determinative factor in finding
liability.
153. Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1233 (rejecting the lower court's "overly restrictive view on what
is necessary to prove intent, state of mind, or purpose" based solely on evidence of the
transferring party's indicated purpose).
154. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 (1lth Cir.
1990) (quoting United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989))
("[C]ourts have not hesitated to look beyond [the] defendant's characterizations to determine
whether a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for disposal of a hazardous substance.");
United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. CIV.A.2:93-0654, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4413, at *4
(S.D. W. Va. 1997) ("[C]ourts consistently find that a transaction does not escape the scope of
section 107(a)(3) and liability as an arranger merely because it is characterized as a sale.") (citing
Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 566; Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1527 (D.
Utah 1995); KN Energy, Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 840 F. Supp. 95, 98 (D. Colo. 1993)).
155. Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1233 (inferring intent "from the indirect action of the parties")
(citations omitted).
156. See, e.g., Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting
that the chemicals were ordinarily used in the buyer's laboratories).
157. See, e.g., A.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 999 (6th Cir. 1993)
(looking to whether "both [the buyer] and [the seller] intended that the chemicals would be used
for the purposes for which they had been bought"--the electroplating and heat treating business);
United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (N.D. 111. 1992) (focusing on
whether the arrangement called for the buyer to entirely use up the product for the purpose for
which it was sold).
158. Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1233-34 (remanding the case to the trier of fact to determine
whether the defendants took "affirmative acts to dispose" of unused solvent by leaving amounts
of solvents in drums sent to the supplier to be returned and reused when emptied and filled with
new solvents).
159. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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The arrangement to dispose in any given case and the "waste"
product are intimately related. Materials vary in their waste status
according to the way they are used. In turn, materials vary in the way
they are used according to the nature of the arrangement between
parties. Courts struggled to balance waste-processing standards
under RCRA with other factors for characterizing arrangements to
dispose. Although the new amendments only address recycled
products and not all useful products, they nevertheless, help to unite
judicial factors with waste-processing standards into a unified
statutory provision.
III. FITTING THE RECYCLING AMENDMENTS INTO THE OVERALL
LIABILITY SCHEME
The recycling amendments' 60 expound on both intent-based
factors and regulatory waste status factors. They combine the
analysis of the first two parts of this Comment and identify factors
that Congress deems appropriate for exempting some arrangements
from CERCLA liability. Nevertheless, although they validate
concepts found in the RCRA regulations and the arranger liability
case law, they are oddly limited to a specific class of materials and
procedures. 161 The amendments consequently raise the question of
whether an exception to liability might result for other analogous
materials and other similar processes. If so, Congress should have
drafted the amendments using broader language to take advantage of
the opportunity to clarify the CERCLA useful product and recycling
defenses. If not, Congress has changed the law by limiting the explicit
recycling exemption to only certain materials and processes.
The amendments to CERCLA explicitly carve out a statutory
exemption to arranger liability that parallels certain aspects of the
useful product and recycling defenses. One amendment sets out a
"liability clarification" whereby a person who arranged for "recycling
of recyclable material" will not be liable for arranging to dispose of or
treat a hazardous substance. 62 Concurrently the statute indicates that
liability for all other types of processing and all other types of
160. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9627 (West Supp. 2001).
161. See infra notes 164-179 and accompanying text.
162. § 9627(a). Note a redundancy on the broadest level of this amendment, given the
exception for "recycling of recyclable material." I&. § 9627(a)(1). Theoretically, Congress
could have provided an exemption for the "recycling of any material." If a person
successfully recycled such material, it would necessarily be a recyclable material.
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materials should still be determined without regard to this section.163
The statute makes a bright-line distinction between "recycling
transactions" and "non-recycling transactions" based on whether they
involve specifically enumerated "recyclable materials:" such as scrap
paper, plastic, glass, metal, rubber, and spent batteries."
The amendments create rigid rules, paralleling concepts in the
case law and RCRA regulations, as to what processing constitutes a
recycling transaction. 65 Under the amendments, the transferor of the
materials must prove that "[a] market existed for the recyclable
material; 166 substantial portions of the recyclable material were made
available for use as feedstock for the manufacture of a new saleable
product;167 [the] recyclable material could have been replaced or
substituted for a virgin raw material;"' 6s and that the person exercised
reasonable care to determine that the facility handling the recyclable
material complied with applicable environmental laws. 69
163. Id. § 9627(a)(2). Additionally, the amendments assure that "[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to affect any defenses or liabilities of any person to whom
subsection (a)(1) ... does not apply." Id. § 9627(e) (entitled "limitation on statutory
construction").
164. Id. § 9627(b). The term explicitly does not include "shipping containers of a
capacity from 30 liters to 3,000 liters,.., having any hazardous substance... contained in
or adhering thereto." Id. § 9627(b)(1). It also does not include "any item of material that
contained polychlorinated biphenyls [PCB's] at a concentration in excess of 50 parts per
million." Id. § 9627(b)(2).
165. Consider, in contrast, how courts have been willing to weigh various factors
relating to a transfer of materials for recycling, without outright requiring that all factors
be present. See Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142
F.3d 769,776 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998). For the comparative discussion of the judicial factors, see
supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
166. § 9627(c)(2). This codifies the factor employed by the RCRA regulations in
analyzing whether a particular material had a market. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(ii). The
material must also meet a "commercial specification grade," specified in 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9627(c)(7), thereby enhancing its marketability. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 737, 747 (D.NJ. 2000) ("[T]he burden falls on the arranger to
show that all the statutory criteria are met.").
167. § 9627(c)(3). This accords with the factors found in the RCRA regulations, which
provide that a recycled material is not a solid waste when it is "used or reused as
ingredients in an industrial process to make a new product ... or used or reused as
effective substitutes for commercial products." Identification and Listing of Hazardous
Wastes, 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(i)-(ii) (2001).
168. § 9627(c)(4). Alternatively, to be exempt, the product made from the recyclable
material "could have been a replacement or substitute for a product made, in whole or in
part, from a virgin raw material." Id. This accords with the factors found in the RCRA
regulations, which provide that a recycled material is not a solid waste when it is
"[r]eturned to the original process from which [it was] generated, and returned as a
substitute for feedstock materials." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(iii).
169. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9627(c)(5)-(6). One such set of laws is, of course, RCRA, and the
RCRA regulations dealing with recycling.
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The most striking component to the analysis is the requirement
that the transferring party exercise "due care" when choosing the
destination for the material. A party will not be exempt from liability
if it had "an objectively reasonable basis to believe" that the
recyclable material would not be recycled, or that a hazardous
substances had been added to the recyclable material for purposes
other than processing for recycling. 170 To determine what is an
"objectively reasonable basis" for this belief, the amendments suggest
factors that courts previously had not explicitly considered.17 1 For
instance, factors include "the size of the person's business, customary
industry practices, [and] ... the ability of the person to detect the
nature of the consuming facility's operations." 172  Despite the
abundance of new language, such as "due care" and "customary
industry practices," the amendments do no more than affirm the
trend in the law that began after CERCLA was enacted that allows a
detailed inquiry into evidence of intent in CERCLA arranger
liability. 173
The recycling amendments enumerate many factors found in
arranger liability case law, and thus, the majority of established
judicial rules are reconcilable with these new amendments. In
determining arranger liability courts have considered factors such as:
evidence of the party's intent at the time of the transfer; 74 the
purpose and inevitable consequences of the transaction;75 whether
the substance was manufactured as a principal business product or a
by-product; 176 whether, before or after the transaction in issue, the
170. Id. § 9627(f)(1)(A)(i)-(B). This is striking in the same way that judicial analysis of
a party's intent was striking, given the overwhelming strict liability nature of the statute.
171. Id. § 9627(f)(2).
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 117-38 and accompanying text (discussing the relatively recent
acceptance and understanding of the role of intent in "an arrangement to dispose"); see
also Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, tit. I,
§ 101, 100 Stat. 1613, 1616 (1986) (codified in relevant parts at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)
(1994)) (exempting owners of contaminated property who took "all appropriate inquiry"
into whether the land was contaminated before purchase from liability).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir.
1996). This parallels the due care analysis of the amendments. § 9627(c)(6)(A)-(B).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. CIV.A.2:93-0654, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4413, at *16 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 27, 1997). Courts have measured inevitable
consequences of the sale through customary industry practices. For example, the Cello-
Foil court cited the "commercially employed methods" of parties in looking at whether
defendants took reasonable care to recycle, just as the amendments measure a reasonable
belief by looking at "customary industry practices." Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.6;
see also § 9627(f)(C)(2).
176. A&W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998)
(noting that ore produced by a mining company was not "a by-product" because it had
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seller regularly discarded the substance as waste; 177 and whether the
product had value on the market.178 Thus, courts applied standards of
due care, marketability, and re-usability of useful products
consistently in all situations in which materials might pass from one
entity to another, and not just in situations involving "recycling"
industries. 9
Nevertheless, the amendments should change the courts' views
on which factors are determinative. For instance, in Gould, Inc. v.
A&M Battery & Tire Service,80 dozens of companies sold lead-acid
batteries that could no longer supply electric current to a recycling
facility." Holding the companies liable for arranging to dispose of a
hazardous substance,182 the court stated that "[t]he test for
successfully asserting ... the 'useful product' defense is whether the
commodity being sold will continue to be used for its originally
intended purpose."183
The recycling amendments do not rely on this test and thus
effectively disavow the reasoning in Gould and any decisions decided
wholly upon that test.y84 The "original intended purpose" test is
stated in a way that is harsher than the amendment's requirement
that the material be a substitute for any product made up of any
virgin raw material. For the amendments or the RCRA regulations,
it does not matter whether recycled lead plates from a battery are
used again in batteries or some completely different product.Y
5
Under the "original intended purpose" case law, it does matter.
Consequently, the early case law limits recyclers more than Congress
intended.
never been processed). This parallels the inquiry into whether the material is made
available as a feedstock for the manufacture of a new saleable product and whether the
material could be a replacement for virgin raw material. § 9627(c)(3)-(4).
177. Louisiana-Pac., Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 24 F.3d 1565,1575 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting
that the defendant would have had no use for the slag it produced as a result of its mining
process and that it had previously dumped some in a bay). This parallels the statutory
reasonable care inquiry. § 9627(c)(6)(B)-(C), (f)(2).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Wedzeb Enters., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1328, 1335 (S.D. Ind.
1994). This parallels the marketability inquiry described in section 9627(c)(2).
179. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
180. 933 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Pa. 1996), vacated by 232 F.3d 162,172 (3d Cir. 2000).
181. Id at 434-36.
182. Id. at 436.
183. Id.
184. For similar applications of this rule, see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text
(discussing other decisions employing similar language).
185. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(1)(ii) (2000) (allowing reuse in commercial products,
and not just in the same type of product).
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Contrary to the ruling of one appellate court, however, the
outcome of Gould I is in accord with the new amendments. The
Third Circuit vacated Gould 1,186 holding instead that the
amendments clearly exempt from liability all those who send batteries
to be recycled, either in whole or in part." Superficially, the
amendments seem to exempt all used-battery sellers from liability.
But the amendments do not require such a broad reading; rather the
amendment can be interpreted to allow recycling of whole batteries
under only limited circumstances. As such, the amendments should
not be read so broadly as to invalidate the Gould I court's analysis as
two recent courts have done.188 The recycling amendments contain
special provisions for the type of transaction involved in Gould: a
transaction involving spent lead-acid batteries. 89 If certain conditions
are met, transactions involving spent lead-acid batteries "shall be
deemed to be arranging for recycling" and thus not a transaction that
leads to liability under section 9607(a)(3). 90
At the same time, however, exceptions to the amendments'
broad exclusion legitimate the distinction between whole batteries
and battery lead absent useless parts. The recycling liability exclusion
does not apply in any case where the defendant fails to meet any of
the objective criteria relating to: 1) the market for the product, 2) its
substantial reuse in a new product, 3) the care exercised to determine
that the facility was in compliance with environmental laws, or 4) any
knowledge the person had that that the material would not be
recycled. 91 The defendant in Gould should not have been able to
establish the substantial reuse factor regarding reuse of the battery.
In Gould, and other "battery-breaking" cases in which the seller
ships whole batteries to a facility knowing that only the lead inside
186. 232 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).
187. Id. at 170-71.
188. Id. (arguing that the amendments exempt from liability all those who send
batteries to be recycled, either in whole or in part); United States v. Mountain Metal Co.,
137 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1281 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (refusing to find a seller of spent lead acid
batteries liable).
189. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9627(b) (West Supp. 2001).
190. Id. § 9627(e).
191. Id. § 9627(c) (stating that the defendant must "demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that all of the ... criteria were met at the time of the transaction"). In this
regard, the amendments do not speak to whether other "tests" or "rules" could be used in
arranger liability cases not involving legitimately "recycled materials" under the
amendments. They leave open the possibility, thus, that other judicial factors such as the
"original purpose test" are applicable in cases not involving "recycled materials." Id.
Moreover, the amendments also leave open the possibility that, just because the recycling
amendment "does not apply" in some cases, id. § 9627 (1), some element of the original
judicial recycling defense might still otherwise apply. Id.
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would be reused,192 the battery is not being reused substantially as
feedstock for a new product. 193 Conceivably, if only one portion of
the battery, the lead, is being reused, there is a significant portion of
the battery that is not being reused. 94 If that is the case, the amount
being reused is not substantial and the exclusion in the amendment
should not apply. A broad reading of the amendments, under which
all battery recyclers are excluded, would effectively change CERCLA
rather than clarify it. Reading the amendments broadly ignores the
careful distinctions within the CERCLA/RCRA definition of
disposal, which requires recycling without discarding.195
Even if the amendments' factors are reconciled in their language
with existing case law, they remain, however, unwisely limited in
application to only certain materials. Given the express limitations of
the rules of the act to recycling transactions, the new amendments
imply that traditional recyclable materials should be subject to
different standards. 96 The statutory construction cannon "expressio
unis est exclusio alterius"'1' would suggest that an express application
192. See United States v. Atlas Lederer Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 828, 835 (2000) (mirroring
the facts and law of Gould). In Atlas Lederer, a company sold used batteries to the United
Scrap Lead Company, who would thereafter remove the lead from the batteries for use in
other products. Id. at 834. The defendant argued that it had no purposeful intent to
dispose of the acids, scrap casings, and other hazardous substances contained in the
batteries, it did not know what the "battery-breaker" was going to do with the substances,
and it never intended for or assisted with putting them on the ground. Id. at 833. The
court, without applying the recycling amendments, asserted that such ignorance could not
exculpate the defendant. Id at 834. So long as the facts show that the defendant knew
that recovery of lead from a battery involves the disposal of unwanted hazardous
materials, this was enough to infer that it should have known that a release of hazardous
substances would occur at the facility. Id. In other words, the burden of proof on this
issue was on the defendant to show that he had no reason to know that the hazardous
substances would be subsequently released, just as it would be under the amendments, in
order to benefit from the statutory exclusion.
193. § 9627(c)(3).
194. The amendments may force battery recyclers to find uses for other parts of the
battery other than the lead. The recycling amendments leave open this possibility.
However, at least for the pre-amendment practice of "battery-breaking," the assumptions
about substantiality of the non-lead, non-reused, parts of the battery are true. See Atlas
Lederer, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (noting testimony in the case that the "battery-breaking"
process typically involved "cutting off battery tops, draining the acid into a pit and
grinding the contaminated casings for disposal at the.., site").
195. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(2)(i), (c)(1) (2001).
196. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9627. The amendments indicate that a determination of liability
under section 9607(a)(3) for any material that is not recyclable material shall be made
without regard to subsections (b)-(e) of the amendments. Id. § 9627(a)(2).
197. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." MacDonald v. GMC, 784 F.
Supp. 486, 493 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); see Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 582-83
(2000) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the canon of expressio unis should apply
to a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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of a set of rules to a specific class of materials, that is, traditionally
recycled materials, excludes all other materials from that particular
rule.
98
Because the amendments explicitly apply to certain recyclable
materials, this may only mean that transactions with these materials
will benefit from a certain presumption of non-liability.
Consequently, while transactions with other materials may be subject
to the same ultimate standards, they would not have the same
presumption of non-liability.'99 If the recycling amendments were
enacted as a clarification of the original CERCLA provisions, and not
a change in the law,' they should have been written more broadly to
address the recycling and useful product issues relating to all
products.20 1
Moreover, despite the assertions of 106th Congress,2°2 the 96th
Congress that enacted CERCLA did not manifestly intend to isolate
198. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 582-83.
199. Despite, or perhaps because of, the reasonable possibility of such a difference in
presumptions, the amendments go out of their way to state that differences in
presumptions should not result from the amendments. See § 9627(l)(2). Whether
Congress likes it or not, it has created a presumption when it states in strong terms that
certain transactions absolutely will not be considered arrangements to dispose. See
§ 9627(a)(1). Courts might not adhere to previous doctrine because they might reason
that Congress left some materials off the exempted list because it intended they normally
should not be recycled at all.
200. See § 9627(a) (titling the section "Liability clarification"); Interstate Non-Ferrous,
99 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 ("The statute is rationally designed to achieve clarification and
consistency in addressing recycler liability under CERCLA to serve the ultimate purpose
of protecting the recycling industry and encouraging recycling."). The debate over
whether the new amendments are really a change in the law or rather only a clarification
in the law has several consequences. The first consequence, of greater relevance to this
Comment, is that Congress may be changing CERCLA to fit a new legal environment
without outwardly admitting it has done so. The second consequence relates to the
retroactivity of the new amendments. This has been the source of most of the litigation on
the amendments since they were enacted and has led to very detailed opinions on the law
of amendment retroactivity. See, e.g., Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at
1127-54 (analyzing the change and clarification issues relating to the recycling
amendments).
201. As the previously discussed case law shows, the dividing line between a recyclable,
reusable, and useful product is not an easy one to draw. See supra notes 29-31 and
accompanying text. Some materials, for instance, may be "useful products" because they
are "recyclable products" or vice versa. Addressing one class of materials without
recognizing the underlying principles that apply to all classes is patently unhelpful.
202. For instance, Senator Lott asserted that "when Congress passed the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
members of both bodies did not want, and did not suggest, that traditional recyclable
materials should be any more subject to Superfund liability than a competitive product
made of virgin material." 145 CONG. REC. S10431 (1999).
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transferors of recycled materials from CERCLA arranger liability.2 °3
If anything, the 96th Congress' choice to incorporate the RCRA
definitions of "disposal" and "treatment," into CERCLA with their
corollary definition of "solid waste," reveals Congress's initial desire
to treat recycling transactions similar to other materials. 2°4 The line
between "traditionally recyclable materials" and all other disposed
materials is not as bright as the more recent Congress suggests. 20 5
The bright-line categories of the new amendments run counter to
the more flexible approach of case law relating to the recycling and
reuse of materials.-°  Regardless of whether the courts explicitly
203. Legislative history, however, never revealed what Congress intended for recycled
materials or other re-useable products under CERCLA section 9607(a)(3) in 1980.
Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 ("CERCLA, as originally enacted,
does not per se address recycling, recycled materials, or recycler liability. It provides no
express exemption for recycling or recyclers."). Nor did Congress specifically debate the
issue of excluding recyclers from liability or including recyclers as liable parties. Id.
("[T]he legislative history of CERCLA 'sheds little light on the intended meaning' of
section 9607(a)(3)'s provision of liability for persons who... 'otherwise arranged for' the
disposal of hazardous substances.") (quoting United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp.,
872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989)).
204. See § 9601(29).
205. Congress manifestly wished to focus on "traditionally recyclable materials" to
solve an isolated problem with standard-fare recycling companies: "While the bill
proposes to amend Superfund, ... it is really a recycling bill. Recycling is not disposal."
145 CONG. REC. S13086 (statement of Sen. Lott, Oct. 25, 1999) ("[The bill] was negotiated
in 1993 between representatives of the industry that recycles traditional materials-paper,
glass, plastic, metals, textiles, and rubber-and representatives of the Environmental
Protection Agency, Department of Justice and the national environmental community.").
Under RCRA, recycling may very well constitute disposal if it is done incorrectly. See 40
C.F.R. § 261.2(a)-(e).
206. If factors relating to the type of arrangement were met, any product could be
recycled or reused, and not just those from a limited pre-established list of materials. In
United States v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1233-34 n.6 (6th Cir. 1996), the
court anticipated the amendments' factors for deciphering whether the defendant took
reasonable care to recycle by asking whether the defendant chose a facility that would
treat its products without simultaneously causing a release of those products into the
environment. In that case, however, the material transferred, used hazardous waste
drums, would not have qualified under the current amendments. Id.; see also Pneumo
Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1998)
(applying case law regarding transactions that do not fall under the recycling amendments
to a case involving transactions that may fall under the recycling amendments); Id. at 775
(holding that the transferor of a factory with working machines containing hazardous
substances was not liable when chemicals leaked out of the machines at the transferee's
site, given that the chemicals were "contained" when sold); Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v.
United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that a fact finder can
find a seller liable for arranging to dispose of a hazardous substance when the buyer
purchased used styrene and removed hazardous materials from the styrene and processed
it further for reuse).
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followed RCRA regulations on recycled materials,2°7 they would carry
out a multi-factor analysis to determine whether an arrangement to
recycle or reuse a product should be characterized as an arrangement
to dispose.0
This is because RCRA treats recycled materials in a continuum
within its overall analysis of solid waste.2 9  There is no basis in
CERCLA's language for singling out "traditionally recycled
materials" transactions from other recycling or reuse transactions. 10
Another consequence of limiting the amendments to only certain
recycling transactions is that the due care inquiry might no longer
remain uniform in all CERCLA cases.
If an inquiry into due care will ultimately differentiate an
arrangement to dispose from an arrangement to recycle,211 one might
question why recyclers of certain traditionally recyclable materials
should be subject to a special rule, while parties interested in
recycling other materials should not be subject to that rule. The
recycling amendments apply to only certain types of materials, yet
they also go into great depth about the proper processes required for
these materials.212 This raises the question of whether, if the same
processes are applied to other non-enumerated materials, those other
207. In some cases, the regulations by necessity left room for judicial inquiry into
whether the materials are recycled in a manner that otherwise constitutes disposal. See
§ 262.1.
208. Courts have emphasized that a bright-line rule does not exist to differentiate
innocent, non-liability-causing transactions from disposals and have striven to consider all
relevant facts in a case. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (stating that
"federal courts have ... continuously emphasiz[ed] that whether an 'arrangement'
constitutes one for disposal depends on the facts of each case"); South Florida Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402,407 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that parties should not
"elevate factors courts found pertinent in particular contexts to the status of bright-line
rules for defining arranger liability"); Douglas County v. Gould, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1242,
1245 (D. Neb. 1994) (noting that the determination of a disposal is a fact specific inquiry
into the nature of the transaction); see also Adam Babich, Dodging a Bullet: Lessons from
the Failed Hazardous Substance Recycling Rider to the Omnibus Appropriations Bill, 29
ENVTL. L. REP. 10139, 10140 (1999). Babich pointed out that a new amendment to
"create greater equity in the ... treatment of recycled versus virgin materials," was not
necessary given the state of the current law. Babich, supra, at 10140. "To the extent that
the recyclable material is essentially the same as raw material, current law may already
provide the "equity" that proponents of [the amendments] sought." I&
209. See § 261.2(e) (stating that all materials have the potential to be excluded from the
definition of solid waste if they are recycled properly, giving no priority to certain classes
of materials over others).
210. The range of materials that can be the subject of a "disposal" in CERCLA is
limited only by the definition of "solid waste." See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1994).
211. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9627(c)(5) (West Supp. 2001) (using due care as a factor in
exempting liability).
212. Id.
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materials can also be exempted. If the amendments cover all possible
processes that might point to a disposal, there is no reason why the
amendments could not apply to all materials 13
The recycling amendments confirm that CERCLA acts both as a
broad remedial and liability statute and a preventive and regulatory
statute.2 14 As such, their effect is to draw CERCLA even closer to
RCRA in the types of activities it governs 15 The legislative record
indicates that the 106th Congress thought that the due care standard
in the recycling amendments would be easy to meet. Furthermore,
the amendments arguably would have the affect of extinguishing all
claims against generators who send hazardous wastes to a recycling
facility 16 This is an admirable goal, but one might question whether
the recycling amendments would not have been better off as part of a
larger overhaul of the whole statute which would incorporate
overlapping concepts in RCRA and CERCLA. 17
From a policy standpoint, one could argue that CERCLA
provides no basis for broadly exempting recycled material
transactions from liability.2 " Encouraging recycling for hazardous
213. One reason might be that recyclers of traditional materials were able to come
together in a coalition to petition for this exclusion from Congress.
214. CERCLA is more regulatory in character in the recycling context, when it seems
to guide or encourage future behavior rather than just correct past behavior. See CHURCH
& NAKAMURA, supra note 121, at 4-5, 19 (noting the traditional views of CERCLA as
non-regulatory and RCRA as regulatory given its "forward looking approach").
215. While CERCLA is generally considered a "remedial," past-looking statute,
commentators have noted that the CERCLA liability scheme can also have the effect of
altering future acts of polluters, thereby acting as a regulatory scheme. See S. REP. No. 96-
848, at 14 n.5 (1980); LLOYD S. DIXON, FIXING SUPERFUND 3 (1994).
216. See 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1136 (quoting 145 CONG. REC. S13086 (Oct. 25, 1999)
(statement of Sen. Lott) ("We had one and only one purpose in introducing the Superfund
Recycling Equity Act-to remove from the liability loop those who collect and ship
recyclables to a third party site."); 145 CONG. REC. S15028 (1999) (statement of Sen.
Lincoln) ("[W]e have written this legislation in such a fashion that virtually all lawsuits
that deal with recycling transactions of paper, glass, plastic, metals, textiles and rubber are
extinguished by this legislation.").
217. Current transfers of hazardous wastes for recycling and reuse would be better
addressed through administrative regulation than b, costly litigation and judicial
oversight. If standards can be laid out clearly and specifically for all recycling in the same
way that the amendments laid out standards for some recycling, litigation costs associated
with this area of law would be reduced because parties would take small measures early to
avoid massive contaminations. CERCLA litigation could be reserved for parsing out the
costs of those egregious disposals intended by the 1980 legislation. See supra note 4
(listing types of widespread contamination that CERCLA was designed to address).
218. The CERCLA liability provisions, without the recycling exception read into them,
may appear harsh or unfair, but it would return to a standard under which those who
contribute in any way to hazardous waste contamination must pay for its cleanup, rather
than an entirely innocent public. See Nagle, supra note 124, at 1496-97.
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materials may pose safety concerns that recycling of other materials
might not.21 9 Treating hazardous wastes as just any other type of
waste poses greater risks that CERCLA never intended to magnify."2
Although a largely regulatory scheme set out by the recycling
amendments will make recyclers more careful in their recycling, this
begs the question why all generators of hazardous substances could
not be encouraged to be more cautious.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether the SREA is a change or clarification, it
must be accepted as a new component of the CERCLA liability
scheme. It does not, at least on its face, purport to alter the statutory
structure of CERCLA. As such, it can be read, along with RCRA,
the RCRA regulations, and the various judicially created factors, as
one of several pieces to the CERCLA liability puzzle. With all the
pieces now presented, several overarching principles emerge. First,
although CERCLA addresses hazardous substances and not wastes,
liability analysis often turns on the physical nature of the material
containing the substances and the processes applied to the substances
to make them useful. This analysis has more to do with RCRA and
its conception of waste and recycling than CERCLA, which does not
even go so far as to define, independently, "disposal" or "solid
waste." A second principle is that courts should generally seek to
address as many components of the law (statutory and common law)
in any given case, as the goals of RCRA and CERCLA may need to
be weighed in coming to a lasting equitable decision. While RCRA
and the SREA openly encourage recycling, CERCLA is less open to
giving leeway to any party who contributes to a hazardous waste
facility. A final principle is that CERCLA still has problems. Courts
and legislators will continue to struggle with the contours of liability
under CERCLA, and the SREA will not be a solution to every
recycling and useful products case.
IAN ERICKSON
219. See Babich, supra note 208, at 10140 (critiquing an identical bill to the one that
became the new recycling amendments one year later). Babich reiterates that recyclable
materials that become hazardous during use differ from most raw materials given the risks
they present and therefore, they should be treated differently. Id.
220. See id
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